Resilient or Repeating Mistakes? Flood Management and Urban Planning in Atlantic City, NJ, Since 2012-present

Introduction:

On a quiet morning following Hurricane Sandy, the differences between the various neighborhoods of Atlantic City cannot be overlooked. In the early morning darkness following a typical high tide, residents of the neighborhood known as Bungalow Park splash through ankle-high water flooding the area as a result of what is a typical high tide following hurricanes and storms like Sandy. But a mile away from the devastation, the pedestrian paths and houses of the Chelsea neighborhood are not impacted but protected with the establishment of infrastructure surrounded by a bulkhead to prevent the flooding from a Hurricane Sandy event from happening again in the future. This is not coincidental because both neighborhoods exist side by side and share the same history, but a different life every day. Yet the waters from the Hurricane Sandy event have retreated to show the tide of inequality today.

Atlantic City was one of the areas hit extremely hard by Hurricane Sandy, though it was even clearer that not all those who were residing in the location were equally capable of dealing with the aftermath. Where the reconstruction of some places saw the building of seawalls and drainage systems, other places had been waiting for assistance for years, since the flooding remained a persistent problem despite the storm that had happened years ago. These disparities of rebuilding cannot solely be accounted for by a geographical lucky draw but are instead indicative of underlying decisions that had been made over several decades to ensure that areas are particularly vulnerable to disasters, which, combined with rising levels, are causing flooding to recur, as it is not a problem that occurred during a particular period but is a problem that keeps on recurring, as levels are rising and levels are dropping.

This uneven topography also leads to a pressing question: why did affluent districts regain normality, while low-income districts were still inundated years after Hurricane Sandy? The case of Atlantic City is one notable example illustrated in this research regarding how money, politics, and urban design combine to affect adaptation capacities to natural disasters. The issue also warrants emphasis, as Hurricane Sandy is merely a one-time occurrence and natural storms and waterfront tidal floods will surely affect Atlantic City and other seaside districts not only today but also in the years to come. If some districts turn out to consistently fare better than others, it could widen these gaps further come the next natural disaster that might get unleashed on that community.

In this thesis, I will propose that the rebuilding of the affected areas of Atlantic City post-Sandy was an unequal process, whereby richer areas were prioritized and fortified, while the poor areas remained vulnerable and continued to flood regularly. The arguments will start by describing the vulnerability of the communities before the arrival of the hurricane, and the geography and priorities of the areas before the hurricane will be analyzed. Secondly, the reconstruction efforts after the Sandy hurricane and the regions that the plans of prevention of flooding targeted will be examined, and lastly, the influence of the policies and investment of the government will be assessed. Thus, by the end of the argumentative statements, it will become patent that the effect of the hurricane deteriorated the situation and that the topic of equality needs to be paramount in the future of the urban area.

Before Sandy: Unequal Vulnerability:

Before Hurricane Sandy made landfall along the coast, Atlantic City was a somewhat flood-prone area. Atlantic City is situated on a barrier island. The land it stands on is along the shores of New Jersey. This land is also several feet above sea level. This already brings into play the risks associated with storm surge flooding events as a consequence of weather events. This would also go through tides as water would flood into Atlantic City without any major weather events occurring. Before the year 2012, sea levels in South Jersey had begun to rise as reported by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Tidal flood events had also begun to enhance flood risks in Atlantic City.¹ This vulnerability meant that Hurricane Sandy did not pose any new risks, as it enhanced an existing vulnerability. Nonetheless, it should be noted that not all of Atlantic City faced the same risks as all regions in Atlantic City did not possess equal protection either.

Atlantic City’s vulnerability to flooding was driven not only by geography but also by socioeconomic inequities existing in the geography of the city. Up-market districts such as Chelsea and Lower Chelsea were comparatively resilient to floods, having been elevated on account of their proximity to the tourist and casino districts. These neighborhoods had been targets for development on account of their economic significance to the city. Conversely, areas that were poor, such as Bungalow Park and Duck Town, were actually in low-lying areas with an outdated drainage infrastructure. These areas were prone to flooding even before the Sandy disaster struck Atlantic City. Government records subsequently validated the observation that infrastructure development had long been concentrated along the boardwalks and tourist areas of the city in upmarket areas like Chelsea and Lower Chelsea.² While the actual history of relevant zoning decisions to locate vulnerable populations in areas prone to flooding needs additional research and documentation, there was certainly a disproportionate distribution of dangers evident even prior to the Sandy event of 2012. 

Conditions in the infrastructure further contributed to the uneven vulnerability of Atlantic City before the arrival of Hurricane Sandy. Many of the stormwater drainage infrastructures in Atlantic City were old, small, and ill-suited to deal with the challenges of rising waters and extreme rainfall. While the stormwater check valves were often broken in poorer districts, leading to the reversal of seawater flow that flooded roads and houses during high tide, infrastructure repairs in wealthier districts received far better maintenance. Per reports by the Atlantic City Resilience Program, repairs to these stormwater check valves had largely taken place after the arrival of Hurricane Sandy.³ The effect of the flood vulnerability the storm caused had, therefore, already existed in the neighborhoods before the arrival of the flood.

This unequal level of flooding exposure, which occurred before Sandy, represents a longer history of inequity and disinvestment that has affected Atlantic City’s poor neighborhoods. For a long period, Atlantic City’s plans and investments focused on tourism, gaming, and boardwalk renewal, to the neglect of residential areas. This precipitated a situation that led to poor investments in working-class neighborhoods, which lacked adequate infrastructure and protection against flooding, while affluent areas enjoyed constant improvements. While a closer scrutiny of financial spending within Atlantic City before 2012 would need further research, it cannot be denied that investments in city infrastructure are geographically defined, primarily reflecting priorities over a period preceding Sandy, to create a condition for the unequal post-storm recovery that occurred.

Hurricane Sandy’s Impact

When Hurricane Sandy made landfall in the final days of October 2012, its storm surge and subsequent flooding in Atlantic City proved disastrous. According to the U.S. Geological Survey’s hydrologic study on the event, the resultant high water marks along the Jersey Shore were historic, with the tides exceeding every one of the previously recorded levels. ⁴ For instance, low-lying residential locations in Atlantic City were the most hit by flood, considering the enormous volume of water that came from the storm surge flooding and overflowing the city during the king high tides. In a particular area of the city called Bungalow Park, the flooding rose into the streets, into residences, and into basements—and in many cases, it stood a number of feet high. Areas of the city in higher elevations, near the boardwalk and the casino area, drained more quickly. Even though the city as a whole seemed to have been impacted directly from Hurricane Sandy, the geography of the city did not lend itself to the surge being realized in the same manner.

Aside from the physical loss, the impact of the hurricane had immediate, drastic effects on the people of Atlantic City. A loss of power affected many people, while the flood destroyed people’s personal property. The coverage done by Scientific American on the impact of the hurricane on Atlantic City underscores that people living in poorer areas suffered the most when the hurricane hit the city because, of course, the amount of money they have influences the extent to which they can deal with the consequences.⁵  Many people lacked flood insurance to repair their houses, hence necessitating the living conditions to deteriorate. Consequently, people were required to relocate from the city. The impact of the hurricane influenced the lives of people, schools, and transport; thus, the isolation of the communities. The effect had not affected all people to the same proportion, but the same people who suffered before the hurricane, when the flood roared. For the low-income earners, the hurricane marked the start of their instability.

Hurricane Sandy may have been a singular disaster, but its impacts and rapid recovery response ranged from neighborhood to neighborhood in the Atlantic City. This is because different locations were more or less vulnerable depending on the topographical position, infrastructure, and resource availability. Affluent areas of the city recovered from the hurricane a lot faster. Other locations like Chelsea, were also more fortunate because of enhanced drainage systems, stronger bulkheads, and the demand from the economic centers for immediate restoration. Less affluent parts of the city, however, took a longer time to dry up. According to _Scientific American,_ it is clear that the stratified attention given to investment, even in the face of disasters, contributed little to the residential sectors of Atlantic City.⁶ While more study is required regarding the differences in the processing of insurance claims and FEMA assistance among the different locations of Atlantic City, the data readily indicate the exacerbation of inequality attributed to Hurricane Sandy.

After Sandy in Wealthy Neighborhoods: Privilege as Resilience

When it came to Hurricane Sandy relief, land use played an essential role in deciding which areas of Atlantic City were to be saved first. Their ‘high-value’ corridors, such as Chelsea and Lower Chelsea Corridors in areas close to the boardwalk and casino region, were identified promptly for assistance and saving. Not only were these areas economically important, but they were also highly noticeable to state governments, capitalists, and visitors. Consequently, initiatives involving flood relief, such as bulkhead rehabilitation and drainage expansion, began in these regions in the early stages of disaster relief. While the zone in Atlantic City needs to be researched in more detail, it appears, however, in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, that land use segments were again prioritized in tourist capital and economic zones rather than in lower-income districts, which were excluded from broad-scale relief projects.

State and city-level planning decisions also made the differences in how far Atlantic City has recovered from Hurricane Sandy and the state of its resiliency. In 2016, a state takeover of Atlantic City led to a rewriting of the rules in terms of infrastructure spending and city planning. Much of the recovery and resilience planning at that time centered around securing the economic hubs of Atlantic City, especially the casino and tourism sectors. This is because this sector is paramount to Atlantic City’s economic survival; thus, investing in this domain came naturally. There was further political capital in this region because, here, citizens could better engage policymakers and gain a voice. Although further research should be carried out to evaluate the minute details of this period’s meetings and planning, it is clear that some choices made at this time prioritized economic viability above residential needs. This is because a post-disaster recovery plan was established which kept the public image and economic pockets of the city intact while putting working-class areas at risk.

The prioritization of infrastructure investment in the wake of Sandy makes these dynamics even more apparent. As outlined in the Atlantic City Resilience Program, a project of the State of New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, a great deal of investment was made in bulkheads, seawalls, and drainage in those areas of the city.⁷  At a glance from project maps and descriptions, it is clear that this investment was centered around the boardwalk, the areas containing casinos, and a residential neighborhood known as Chelsea. These efforts were successful in mitigating flood risk in a direct, immediate way in areas of higher economic status, facilitating economic activity to resume. However, they also demonstrate a lack of investment in infrastructure in areas of lower economic status. Infrastructure in less economically advantaged areas was restricted to infrastructural surveys, not replacements, continuing a cycle of inequality created in the wake of disaster.

Although these projects, after Sandy, enhanced the near-term resilience of affluent areas against flooding, they did not provide timely and equitable solutions for the long-term effects of climate change. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, sea-level rise and Rising water are expected to increase drastically within the South Jersey coastline, making stand-alone resilience projects ineffective. ⁸ Most of the resilience projects carried out within Atlantic City targeted the protection of particular assets rather than the development of an entire citywide resilience plan. Therefore, resilience was segmented to provide affluent areas of the city with armor against current dangers while leaving the vulnerable areas of the city susceptible to future sea-level rise. Even within the development of resilience as a response to the dangers of sea-level rise, this issue suggests that advantage can itself provide resilience to the dangers of sea-level rise because the affluent areas of Atlantic City were able to plan for the future even while the vulnerable areas of the city were left to fend off the dangers of sea-level rise.

After Sandy in Lower-Income Neighborhoods: Resilience Without Resources

“Neighborhoods such as Bungalow Park/Ducktown have been the most affected in the years after the storm. Some parts of the city are just now beginning the recovery process, but communities are experiencing repeated damage to homes, mold accumulation, as well as expensive repairs, which are unaffordable. According to Scientific American, “Residents in those neighborhoods either didn’t have flood insurance or the capital to recover. They were forced either to live in unsafe environments or give up residence altogether. This was the consequence for those who didn’t have the same economic support that others had after the storm.’”⁹ This cycle affects the economy in the sense that flooding became more than just an occasional event; instead, it became a continuous menace that shook the economic stability of homes, health, and jobs.

Also, one of the factors that made those neighborhoods potentially vulnerable, and this continued to be the case even after Sandy, was related to their political influence and representation in the planning for the recovery efforts. There were fewer chances for low-income communities to be involved in the planning regarding infrastructure spending in a neighborhood and what projects could be carried out. Most of those planning debates took place at either the state or city level of governance, and the focus there remained on economic and tourism sectors. Thus, the concerns of residential neighborhoods struggling with chronic flooding were frequently sidelined. Though deeper research might be required to examine city council representation and meeting records, outcomes suggest exclusion itself. Areas of lesser political visibility garnered fewer protective measures-a precipitating factor, reinforcing the idea that resilience gets constituted as much by power as by geography. Lacking any meaningful representation, low-income communities had little control over those decisions that directly impacted their safety and futures.

However, despite these challenges, the neighborhoods in the low-income areas did not just wait for things to happen. The residents made their voices heard on the flooding problems they are facing in their neighborhoods by attending relevant meetings. According to Scientific American, the communities recorded their flood events in order to call for repairs to be made; however, their cries for help went largely unnoticed by their government.¹⁰ This disparity between the lack of awareness from communities in action by their government draws attention to how environmental injustice not only happens by doing nothing but also by not being addressed in an equal manner.

However, the biggest challenge that may be facing lower-income areas post-Sandy is being left out of long-term plans to adapt to a changing climate. While projects to improve infrastructure post-Sandy may have repaired what was damaged, this is often a short-term solution to long-term problems of inadequate drainage, a close-to-mean-sea-level position, and rising sea levels. The Union of Concerned Scientists points to continued increases in the danger of tidal flooding along the Southern Jersey coast, meaning any short-term solutions are bound to be short-lived.¹¹ Rutgers University’s Coastal Vulnerability Assessment in Atlantic City validates that areas like Bungalow Park are some of the most vulnerable areas to coastal erosion and storm-related events due to position, land use, and outdated infrastructure.¹² Residents in those areas are still experiencing levels of “sunny day flooding,” in which streets are periodically flooded just due to the highest tides, even without any storm events occurring.

Conclusion:

The impact of Sandy on Atlantic City marks a defining moment, but the impact that the hurricane has left, particularly regarding the issue of equality, is not the hurricane itself. It lies, rather, in the disparity of the land use that has mandated the quick return on investment and flood protection efforts, including the erection of sea gates, the digging of tunnels to bring power to the city, and the reconstruction of infrastructure for the more prosperous sides of the city, such as Chelsea. The other, poorer sides, such as Bungalow Park and Ducktown, experience extensive periods of flooding. This paper indicates that the post-hurricane inequality pattern of Atlantic City did not vary according to natural geography but according to intentional decisions.

These findings have great implications not only for the reconstruction of the past but also for the future Atlantic City is facing. On the eastern coast of New Jersey, the level of the sea will continue to rise, and the magnitude of these flood events also will continue to grow. Unless the status quo changes, the same communities that faced the danger of the flood after storm Sandy face the most significant danger now, due to the potential consequences of the storm surges. The ever-increasing crisis of environmental injustice will escalate while the rate of transition, which is a result of climate change, speeds up if the present method of the plans of resilience, the focus on which lies on economic assets, not communities, persists. It has already become quite significant that the Atlantic City experience serves as a critical lesson in a sense that disasters, even the response to them, face uneven challenges.

As the city looks to the future, it must begin to consider a different approach to the concepts of resilience and protection, and how those resources are allocated. Flood protection and adaptation initiatives must be directed not towards the communities of greatest economic value but those of greatest vulnerability. This means investing not just in the drainage systems and adaptation initiatives but also recognizing the need for the engagement of the residents of the communities in question in decisions regarding policies that impact the residents of those communities. From the experience of Atlantic City following the devastation of Sandy, it’s clear that the city recognizes a different approach to the concept of resilience, one in which the right to resilience, rather than a luxury of the privileged class, becomes a right.

Endnotes

1. “Sea Level Rise and Tidal Flooding in the South Jersey Shore.” Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/resources/sea-level-rise-and-tidal-flooding-south-jersey-shore. 
2. New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Atlantic City Resilience Program: Project Summaries, accessed 2025, https://www.nj.gov/dca/ddrm/programs/ACresilience.shtml.
3. New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Atlantic City Resilience Program: Infrastructure Assessments, accessed 2025, https://www.nj.gov/dca/ddrm/programs/ACresilience.shtml.
4. U.S. Geological Survey, Documentation and Hydrologic Analysis of Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey, October 29–30, 2012, Scientific Investigations Report 2016–5085 (Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey, 2016), https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/sir20165085.
5. John Upton, “The Injustice of Atlantic City’s Floods,” Scientific American, May 14, 2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-injustice-of-atlantic-city-rsquo-s-floods/.
6. John Upton, “The Injustice of Atlantic City’s Floods,”
7. New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Atlantic City Resilience Program: Project Summaries, accessed 2025,https://www.nj.gov/dca/ddrm/programs/ACresilience.shtml.
8. Union of Concerned Scientists, Sea Level Rise and Tidal Flooding in the South Jersey Shore (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, March 30, 2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/sea-level-rise-and-tidal-flooding-south-jersey-shore.
9. John Upton, “The Injustice of Atlantic City’s Floods,” Scientific American, May 14, 2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-injustice-of-atlantic-city-rsquo-s-floods/.
10. Upton, “The Injustice of Atlantic City’s Floods.”
11. Union of Concerned Scientists, Sea Level Rise and Tidal Flooding in the South Jersey Shore (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, March 30, 2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/sea-level-rise-and-tidal-flooding-south-jersey-shore.
12. Environmental Analysis & Communications Group, Rutgers University, Coastal Vulnerability Assessment: Atlantic City, New Jersey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, May 2017),https://www.nj.gov/dep/bcrp/docs/cva/atlantic-city-cva-final-05-2017.pdf. NJ.gov